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ABSTRACT/RESUMÉ 
The effects of downturns on labour force participation: evidence and causes 
This paper uses an impulse-response function approach to assess the magnitude and persistence of the 
effects of downturns on labour force participation for a sample of 30 countries over the period 1960-2008. 
Past severe recessions appear to have had a significant and persistent impact on participation, while 
moderate downturns did not. The aggregate participation rate effect of severe downturns peaked on 
average at about 1½ to 2½ percentage points five to eight years after the cyclical peak, and was still 
significant after almost a decade. Youths and older workers account for the bulk of this effect. Institutional 
and policy settings are found to be an important factor having shaped the response of participation to 
economic downturns. In particular, early retirement incentives embedded in old-age pension schemes and 
other social transfer programmes are found to amplify the responsiveness of older workers’ participation to 
economic conditions. However, the findings in this paper do not seem to apply to the most recent crisis, 
partly because the labour market situation did not deteriorate as much as the magnitude of the recession 
would have suggested in a number of OECD countries.  
JEL classification: J21, J26, C23, E32, H55 
Keywords: crises; downturns; recessions; labour force participation; retirement; hysteresis 
***** 
Les effets des retournements de conjoncture sur la participation au marché du travail :  
évidence et causes 
Cet article utilise une approche impulsion-réponse pour évaluer l’ampleur et la persistance des effets 
des retournements de conjoncture sur la participation au marché du travail pour un échantillon de 30 pays 
de l’OCDE sur la période 1960-2008. Il apparaît que les récessions sévères ont eu un impact significatif et 
persistant sur la participation dans le passé, au contraire des retournements de cycle plus modérés. L’effet 
agrégé des récessions sévères sur la participation a atteint un pic de 1½ à 2½ points de pourcentage cinq à 
huit ans après le point haut du cycle, et était toujours significatif après presque une décennie. Les jeunes et 
les seniors ont contribué à l’essentiel de cet effet. Les facteurs politiques et institutionnels jouent un rôle 
important dans la réponse de la participation aux retournements conjoncturels. En particulier, il apparaît 
que les incitations au départ anticipé à la retraite contenues dans les régimes de retraite et les autres 
systèmes de transferts sociaux accroissent la sensibilité de la participation des seniors aux conditions 
économiques. Pour autant, les résultats de cet article ne semblent pas s’appliquer à la crise récente, en 
partie parce que la situation du marché du travail ne s’est pas détériorée autant que l’ampleur de la 
récession aurait pu le suggérer dans un certain nombre de pays de l’OCDE. 
Classification JEL: J21, J26, C23, E32, H55 
Mots clés : crises ; retournements de conjoncture ; récessions ; participation au marché du travail ; retraite ; 
hystérèse 
 
Copyright © OECD, 2011. All rights reserved. Application for permission to reproduce or translate 
all, or part of, this material should be made to: Head of Publications Service, OECD, 2 rue 
André-Pascal, 75775 PARIS CEDEX 16, France. 
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THE EFFECTS OF DOWNTURNS ON LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION: 
EVIDENCE AND CAUSES 
By Romain Duval, Mehmet Eris and Davide Furceri1
1. Introduction 
 
Unemployment hysteresis has been the subject of an extensive theoretical and empirical literature 
since at least Blanchard and Summers (1986, 1988). There is a mild consensus today that although changes 
in institutions alone contributed to the rise in and the persistence of high continental European 
unemployment starting from the mid-1970s (Bassanini and Duval, 2009; Nickell et al., 2005), interactions 
between pre-existing institutional settings and a series of adverse macroeconomic shocks, i.e. hysteresis 
mechanisms, also played a role (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000). 
By contrast, the issue of labour force participation hysteresis has received limited attention.2
Elmeskov and Pichelmann (1993) find using cross-country times-series data that high unemployment 
benefit duration amplifies participation declines in the wake of downturns. Based on a simple dynamic 
model of transitions between employment, unemployment and non-participation in the presence of 
disability schemes, Autor and Duggan (2003) show that such schemes can indeed amplify permanent 
labour market withdrawal in the event of adverse shocks, and confirm their findings on time-series state-
level data for the United States. Based on individual survey data, Coile and Levine (2007, 2009) find that 
retirement decisions respond to economic conditions – a result supported by Von Wachter (2007) and 
Hallberg (2008) – and that this cyclical sensitivity is amplified by available public retirement provisions. 
 Yet basic 
arithmetic and economic theory both suggest that its contribution to overall employment hysteresis could 
potentially be large. Aggregate participation rates have changed markedly over the past four decades, and 
these shifts have been more heterogeneous across countries than those of unemployment (measured in 
percentage point changes) – although some of this may of course reflect heterogeneous underlying trends 
in e.g. female labour participation. On the theoretical side, some labour force participation decisions have 
been modeled as being partly or even fully irreversible, not least the retirement decision of older workers 
(see e.g. Lazear, 1987). This opens the possibility that adverse macroeconomic shocks may turn temporary 
participation declines into persistent reductions, especially where social transfer programmes exist that can 
be used as exit pathways when the value of job search declines – as is typically the case in crisis times.  
                                                     
1. At the time of writing the authors were respectively Head of Division and economists at the OECD 
Economics Department. They authors would like to express gratitude to Philip Bagnoli, Tonje Lauritzen 
and David Turner for helpful suggestions and comments. The authors retain full responsibility for errors 
and omissions. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent 
those of the OECD or its member countries. 
2. By contrast, there is a more extensive literature on the “scarring” effects of recessions on the future wage 
and/or job prospects of cohorts that enter the labour market in such periods (see e.g. Raaum and Roed, 
2006). This literature is ignored here as it does not address the issue of whether crises have persistent 
effects on the labour force participation of the overall labour force or of particular age groups. 
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Tatsiramos (2010) draws comparable conclusions from individual survey data for the EU, showing that 
more generous unemployment benefits for older workers lower the probability of re-employment in the 
event of displacement. A number of case studies have also documented durable participation declines in 
the aftermath of past recessions as a result of large inflows into disability, sickness and early retirement 
schemes, for instance for the Netherlands, the United Kingdom (Nickell and Van Ours, 2000), and Canada 
(Fortin and Fortin, 1999). 
This paper takes a broader perspective and assesses participation hysteresis for a panel of OECD 
countries spanning several decades, including all major past recessions. Its contribution to the literature is 
two-fold. First, using an impulse-response function approach, the dynamic effects of downturns on labour 
force participation are explored both in aggregate and for each demographic group. Second, cross-country 
variability in summary measures of retirement incentives is exploited to assess the extent to which they 
account for the greater responsiveness of older workers’ labour force participation to downturns.  
Our main findings are the following. First, only severe recessions appear to have a significant impact 
on participation, while moderate downturns do not. The aggregate participation rate effect of severe 
downturns peaks on average at about 1½ to 2½ percentage points after five to eight years following the 
cyclical peak, and is still significant after almost a decade. Second, youths and older workers account for 
aggregate participation declines in the aftermath of severe downturns. Third, the labour market withdrawal 
of older workers is amplified by early retirement incentives.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the general empirical approach 
and implements it to quantify the labour force participation effects of past downturns both in aggregate and 
for various age and gender groups, based on a panel of OECD countries spanning over four decades. 
Section 3 focuses on the participation of older workers more specifically and assesses the extent to which 
early retirement incentives amplify their labour market withdrawal in the aftermath of downturns. Section 
4 concludes.  
2. The effect of downturns on labour force participation 
2.1. Methodology and data 
 A natural starting point is to analyse the response of labour force participation during downturn 
episodes. Downturns are classified on the basis of the magnitude of the change in the OECD’s output gap 
measure between successive peaks and troughs, where the smallest value in the peak-to-trough change in 
the output gap to identify a downturn is 3 percentage points. Troughs are identified by searching for local 
minima of negative quarterly output gaps over four year windows. Cyclical peaks, on the other hand, are 
identified by looking at the maxima of positive output gaps over the eight quarters preceding the period in 
which the output gap turns negative. While pitfalls in estimating output gap levels are well known, this 
strategy for identifying downturns relies on changes in output gaps, which removes most of the potential 
measurement problem. The change in the output gap is approximately the difference between the observed 
GDP growth rate and the unobserved potential growth rate, and that difference is merely used to assign a 
value of zero or one to the downturn dummy variable that will ultimately be used in the regressions. This 
approach guards us against the risk of an identification strategy that would rely heavily on unobserved 
variables, at least provided the OECD estimates of potential growth – which in practice come close to 
filtered GDP growth – are not “too” mistaken. Once downturn episodes are identified, a downturn dummy 
variable is constructed that takes value 1 in downturn years, which correspond to the year of the previous 
cyclical peak,, and zero otherwise. Alternative thresholds are also used for the change of output gap in 
order to classify downturns as: a) moderate (when the peak-to-trough change in the output gap is between 
3 and 6 percentage points); b) severe (between 6 and 9 percentage points); and c) very severe (above 9 
percentage points). In particular, downturn dummies for different magnitudes are constructed as: 
 ECO/WKP(2011)44 
 7 
 
Moderate Downturn:  
(1a) 
Severe Downturn:   
(1b) 
Very Severe Downturn: 
(1c) 
 The choice of these thresholds provides a balanced number of episodes in each category 
(20 moderate downturns, 20 severe downturns and 11 very severe downturns) and most of the severe 
downturns can be recognised as episodes when either the global economy was in recession, so occurring in 
the early 1970s or early 1980s following oil price shocks, or when individual economies were experiencing 
particular hardship, as for example following the Nordic banking crises of the early 1990s (Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Downturn episodes 
Moderate Severe Very Severe 
Country Time Country Time Country Time 
AUT 1991 AUS 1993 AUS 1981 
AUT 2000 AUT 1980 DNK 1986 
BEL 1980 CAN 1981 FIN 1989 
BEL 1990 CAN 1989 HUN 1992 
CHE 2000 CHE 1990 IRL 1990 
DEU 2000 CZE 1996 ISL 1988 
FIN 1980 ESP 1978 PRT 1980 
FRA 1980 ESP 1990 PRT 1991 
FRA 1991 GRC 1992 SWE 1990 
ITA 1990 IRL 1981 UK 1979 
ITA 2001 ITA 1980 USA 1978 
JPN 1980 JPN 1973 
  JPN 1991 KOR 1979 
  JPN 1997 LUX 1979 
  NLD 1991 MEX 2000 
  NLD 2000 NLD 1980 
  POL 1999 NOR 1987 
  PRT 2001 NZL 1989 
  SWE 1975 UK 1989 
  USA 1989 USA 1973 
  
Source: OECD calculations. 
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The dynamic impact of downturn episodes on labour force participation is estimated following the 
approach proposed by Jorda (2005), which allows the impulse response functions (IRFs) to be estimated 
directly. For each year k following the onset of the downturn, the estimation equation has the following 
form:  
 (2) 
where  is the labour force participation rate of age/gender group m in country i in period t+k 
considered,  is a downturn dummy that takes value 1 for the start of a downturn episode in period t in 
country i and zero otherwise,  represents country fixed effects,  captures the persistence in changes in 
labour force participation and  measures the impact of the downturn on the change in the labour force 
participation for each future period k. Impulse response functions (IRFs) are then readily obtained from the 
estimated  for k = 0, 1,..12. Equation 2 is estimated with a least-squares dummy variable (LDSV) 
method using annual data for an unbalanced panel of 30 OECD countries over the period 1960-2008. 
Country-fixed effects capture unobserved country-specific determinants of participation. Correction for 
heteroskedasticity is applied using White robust standard errors, and the error autocorrelation problem is 
addressed by using the two lags of the increase in labour force participation as control variables. Potential 
reverse causality is addressed by estimating changes in labor force participation in the years that follow a 
downturn. 
An alternative way of estimating the dynamic impact of downturns on labour force participation 
would be to estimate an ARDL equation for labour force participation including downturn dummies, and to 
derive IRFs from the estimated coefficients. This approach was initially proposed by Romer and Romer 
(1989, 2010), and it has been recently applied by Cerra and Saxena (2008), Furceri and Mourougane 
(2009) and Furceri and Zdzienicka (2011) to assess the impact of financial crises on economic activity. 
However, the IRFs derived using an ARDL specification tend to be sensitive to the choice of the number of 
lags, and as a result tend to be unstable. In addition, long-lasting effects of shocks may be unduly found, 
reflecting the use of what Cai and Den Haan (2009) call one-type-of-shock models. In contrast, the 
approach used in the present paper does not suffer from these problems because lagged changes in labour 
force participation enter only as control variables and are not used to derive the IRFs, and because the 
structure of the equation do not impose permanent effects. Finally, the confidence bands associated with 
the estimated IRFs are easily computed using the standard deviations of the estimated coefficients , and 
Monte-Carlo simulations are not required.  
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2.2. Empirical results  
 The results suggest a clear distinction between the effects of moderate, severe and very severe 
downturns on labour force participation (Table 2 and Figure 1). Moderate downturns do not appear to have 
any statistically significant effect on participation. For severe downturn episodes, there is a negative effect 
which peaks at about 1½ percentage points five years after the preceding cyclical peak, but is still 
significant after nine years. For very severe downturn episodes, the maximum effect is about 
2½ percentage five to eight years after the preceding cyclical peak, with a significant effect even after ten 
years.  
 
Table 2. The impact of downturns on labour force participation 
Year after impact Moderate downturns Severe downturns Very severe downturns 
t+1 0.063 (-0.84) -0.244 (-1.65)*** -0.600 (-4.12)*** 
t+2 -0.053 (-0.37) -0.632 (-2.37)*** -1.535 (-4.96)*** 
t+3 -0.222 (-0.96) -1.038 (-3.15)*** -1.940 (-3.40)*** 
t+4 -0.357 (-1.25) -1.334 (-3.34)*** -2.345 (-3.49)*** 
t+5 -0.200 (-0.59) -1.644 (-3.55)*** -2.520 (-3.39)*** 
t+6 -0.004 (-0.01) -1.447 (-2.59)*** -2.424 (-3.36)*** 
t+7 0.113 (-0.30) -1.395 (-2.37)*** -2.299 (-2.85)*** 
t+8 -0.284 (-0.66) -1.208 (-2.13)*** -2.520 (-2.58)*** 
t+9 0.418 (-0.78) -1.243 (-2.39)*** -2.353 (-2.31)*** 
t+10 0.622 (-1.03) -0.921 (-1.78)*** -1.944 (-2.23)*** 
t+11 0.581 (-0.89) -0.928 (-1.68)*** -1.422 (-1.81)*** 
t+12 0.527 (-0.71) -0.808 (-1.25)*** -1.479 (-2.23)*** 
Note: T-statistics based on robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
Source: OECD calculations. 
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Figure 1. The effect of downturns on labour force participation 
A. Moderate downturns 
 
B. Severe downturns 
 
C. Very severe downturns 
 
Source: OECD calculations. 
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 The results are overall robust to the inclusion of time fixed effects, common time trends and 
country specific time trends. Indeed, repeating the analysis for severe and very severe downturns – 
i.e. excluding moderate downturns, given that they do not appear to significantly affect labour force 
participation –, the maximum effect is found to be about 2 percentage points in all specifications, and it 
remains significant even ten years after the outset of the original shock (Table 2 and Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. The effect of severe and very severe downturns – robustness tests  
Baseline            Time fixed effects 
  
Common time trends         Country specific time trends 
  
Source: OECD calculations. 
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To test whether different demographic groups have different participation responses to (severe and 
very severe) downturns, Equation 2 is re-estimated for men and women and for ten different five-year age 
groups ranging from 15-19 years up to 60-64 years. Somewhat surprisingly, the results show a slightly 
larger and more persistent impact of downturns on overall labour force participation for men than for 
women. For men, the effect at the peak is in the order of 2% and it remains statistically significant even 
12 years after the shock (Figure 3). For both males and females, the most significant and largest effects are 
found for the youngest and oldest age groups (Table 3). In particular, the labour force participation rates of 
the 15-19 and 20-24 age groups are found to decrease by up to 6 and 4 percentage points, respectively. For 
the 60-64 age group, the maximum effect is estimated to be in the order of 4 percentage points.  
 The analysis based on age groups provides information on how labour force participation of 
different age groups has changed over time. However, the impact of downturns on the labour participation 
of a specific five-year group at various horizons reflects a mix of effects on the participation of different 
cohorts who enter this age category at different dates –e.g. the estimated impact on the participation of the 
60-64 age group at time t+5 is the impact on the group aged 55-59 at time t of the shock. Therefore, as a 
complementary analysis, the regressions are re-run focusing only on specific cohorts. The results, not 
shown here for brevity, confirm the significance of the (persistent) impact of downturns on labour force 
participation. 
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Figure 3. The effect of severe and very severe downturns by gender 
A. Total 
 
B. Men 
 
C. Women 
 
Source: OECD calculations. 
 
ECO/WKP(2011)44 
 14 
Table 3. Maximum decline in the participation rate for different age groups  
 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-59 50-54 55-59 60-64 
Men -5.9*** -4.6*** -1.2*** -0.8*** -1.0*** -0.8 -0.5 -0.5 -0.2*** -4.1*** 
Women -6.0*** -3.9*** -1.1*** -0.8*** -0.2*** -0.3 -0.3 -0.8 -4.0*** -3.4*** 
Note: T-statistics based on robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
Source: OECD calculations. 
3. Retirement incentives and the responsiveness of older workers’ labour force participation  
to downturns 
The fact that the effect of downturns on labour force participation is mostly concentrated on younger 
and older age groups worker provides a rationale for focusing on these groups when analysing the drivers 
of overall participation hysteresis. In principle, alleviating permanent labour force withdrawal of youths or 
“scarring” effects on their lifetime incomes would seem a more important issue than preventing anticipated 
retirement of older workers. This is because adverse impacts of shocks on the labour market performance 
of current youths can affect a whole generation for their entire working life, while the impact of earlier-
than-expected retirement of older workers may be comparatively short-lived, merely anticipating their 
unavoidable labour force withdrawal by a couple of years.  
However, the normative implications of a significant drop in youth labour force participation 
following downturns are unclear insofar as such decline reflects increased enrolment in education 
compared to a no-shock baseline scenario – as opposed to reflecting e.g. entry into disability systems. And 
indeed there is solid country-specific and cross-country empirical evidence that schooling is counter-
cyclical (see e.g. Dellas and Sakellaris, 2003; Dejong and Ingram, 2001; Heylen and Pozzi, 2007). 
Accumulating more human capital at times of economic distress may or may not be optimal from 
individual and economy-wide perspectives, depending on the relative marginal returns from studying 
versus entering the labour market immediately. Addressing this issue goes beyond the scope of the present 
paper. Therefore, youth labour force participation is ignored in what follows. 
By contrast, labour market withdrawal of older workers in the wake of downturns entails persistent 
employment output losses that are not offset by any future gains, as the retirement decision is typically 
irreversible. While retiring earlier than initially planned at times of economic distress might still be 
individually optimal, it is not necessarily the case at the society level if such retirement is financed by 
others through their contributions to Pay-As-You-Go schemes and these schemes themselves are not 
neutral with respect to the retirement decision. Furthermore, early withdrawal by one cohort may 
permanently affect retirement age norms for future cohorts, which are known to influence effective 
retirement ages (see e.g. Lumsdaine et al., 1996). One major issue in this regard is whether the early 
retirement incentives embedded in old-age pension systems and other social transfer programmes that have 
been used as de facto early retirement schemes may amplify the labour market withdrawal of older workers 
in bad times, and thereby participation hysteresis. In particular, early retirement through dedicated schemes 
or via unemployment or disability systems has typically been an option in some countries conditional on 
being laid off (see e.g. Blöndal and Scarpetta, 1998). It would therefore be expected that they would be 
used more heavily in the wake of downturns than in normal times. The remainder of this paper tests 
empirically for such effects. Summary measures of retirement incentives across OECD countries and over 
time are first constructed and discussed, before turning to panel analysis of the interactions between such 
incentives and cyclical conditions in determining the dynamics of the (relative) labour force participation 
of older workers. 
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3.1. Summary measures of retirement incentives in OECD countries 
Motivation 
In order to explore the impact of early retirement incentives on the response of older workers’ labour 
force participation to downturns, and to cyclical developments more broadly, implicit marginal taxes on 
continued work at older ages are computed for 30 countries over the period 1960-2008. When the cost of 
working for an additional year, in terms of foregone pensions and contributions to the system, is not 
exactly offset by an increase in future pension benefits, i.e. when the change in pension wealth from 
working for an additional year is less than the value of contributions paid, the pension system carries an 
implicit marginal tax on continued work. This summary measure of retirement incentives embedded in old-
age pension systems depends on all of the scheme’s parameters, including inter alia the minimum age of 
eligibility to a pension, the replacement rate and the existence and magnitude of actuarial adjustments for 
anticipated and deferred retirement. 
In theory, labour supply effects of implicit taxes on continued work are ambiguous (Mitchell and 
Fields, 1984). As suggested by Lazear (1987), they can be regarded as an additional component of the 
“true wage”, over and above the usual wage rate. From this perspective, a rise in the implicit tax on 
continued work is equivalent to a fall in the wage rate, producing opposite substitution and income effects. 
In practice, there is overwhelming empirical evidence that the substitution effect dominates (Lazear, 1987; 
Lumsdaine and Mitchell, 1999). Implicit tax rates on continued work also bear a very close (negative) 
relationship with measures of the option value of postponing retirement derived from an option value 
model à la Stock and Wise (1990), which have also been found to affect the retirement decision in 
microeconometric studies (see e.g. Gruber and Wise, 2002). Therefore high implicit taxes on continued 
work tend to bias the retirement decision towards early labour market withdrawal. The question addressed 
below is whether such taxes also lead to labour force participation hysteresis, over and above any effects 
on steady-state participation rates. 
Computation 
Implicit tax rates on continued work vary depending on a large number of mostly individual factors.3
Under this set of assumptions, implicit tax rates are computed as follows. As a first step, for each 
possible retirement age R between 55 and 70, the future stream of expected pension payments is computed 
from age R to age 105. Pension wealth is then computed as the present value of this stream using the 
following formula: 
 
In this paper, summary measures of implicit taxes are computed for an illustrative worker under a set of 
common simplifying assumptions. This hypothetical worker is assumed to be single, to have entered the 
labour market at age 20, and to have worked full-time at the average wage until the age considered. In 
order to make the calculations manageable for a wide range of countries and time periods, the tax treatment 
of earnings – with the exception of contributions to pension schemes, which are taken into account – and 
benefits is omitted, so that “gross” implicit tax rates on continued work are computed (for methodological 
details and data sources, see Duval, 2006). 
                                                     
3. For instance, in flat-rate pension systems, these factors may include earnings history, household 
composition and the amount of other income and/or assets. In earnings-related pension schemes, they 
usually include inter alia the length of the working life and other periods to be credited for pension 
purposes (such as education, child care and unemployment), as well as the age-earnings profile over the 
worker’s career. Furthermore, these schemes may differ across sectors and/or types of jobs. 
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where PWYR is the pension wealth (as a proportion of earnings) for a single individual with APW earnings 
retiring at age R, RA is the replacement rate (computed as PA/Y) that this individual would receive at age A 
if he or she stops working now, r is the real discount rate, and SA is the value of the survival function at age 
A.  
Pension wealth levels are computed for all possible retirement ages between 55 and 70. For the three 
retirement ages 55, 60 and 65, changes in pension wealth from working for five additional years (i.e. from 
R to R+5) are then computed as: 
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where CA / Y is the sum of employees and employers rates of contributions to the old-age pension system.  
The choice of 5-year rather than annual changes in pension wealth is dictated by the fact that the 
historical series of labour force participation statistics used in the empirical analysis are available only for 
5-year age groups. When the change in pension wealth from remaining in the labour market during each of 
these life spans – i.e. from working between ages 55 and 60, 60 and 65 and 65 and 70, respectively – is 
negative, continuing to work for five additional years carries an implicit tax whose average over the 5-year 
span is -DPWYR / 5.  
Accounting for early retirement schemes 
Implicit tax rates on continued work are computed not only for old-age pension systems but also for 
various social transfer programmes, which in a number of industrial (mostly continental European) 
countries have often enabled certain categories of older workers to withdraw from the labour market before 
the earliest possible age of entitlement to old-age pension benefits. These early pathways into retirement 
include special early retirement provisions as well as unemployment-related and disability benefits 
(Blöndal and Scarpetta, 1998; Duval, 2003). They often entail high implicit taxes on continued work for 
two main reasons: replacement rates are usually high, and pension rights continue to accrue even if, in 
some cases, at a reduced rate. As a result, these schemes have been found to lower the participation of 
older workers (e.g. Kyyrä and Wilke, 2007).  
The computation of implicit tax rates in these schemes is the same as presented above, except that the 
stream of payments considered is what the individual would receive through these schemes rather than 
through the “regular” old-age pension system. However, no attempt is made here at being comprehensive 
in the coverage of these programmes. Rather, in order to provide an overall assessment of retirement 
incentives arising from them, a “typical early retirement route” is modeled along the following lines: in 
those countries where unemployment-related benefits can be used de facto to bridge the time until people 
are entitled to an old-age pension,4
                                                     
4. Social transfer programmes that can be used de facto as early retirement devices are identified as follows. 
Unemployment benefit schemes fall into this category when they include special dispositions for older 
workers, such as no obligation to search for a job. Similarly, disability schemes are classified as early 
retirement schemes when disability pensions can be granted not only on the basis of health but also labour-
market criteria. 
 implicit taxes on continued work are computed for the same illustrative 
cases as for old-age pension schemes; where unemployment-related schemes cannot be used effectively as 
an early retirement device but other schemes (e.g. disability schemes) are widely available, the latter are 
 ECO/WKP(2011)44 
 17 
considered; where no social transfer programme can be used to withdraw from the labour market before 
the minimum pensionable age, the “early retirement route” is simply the old-age pension pathway into 
retirement. 
The implicit tax on continued work obtained using the above methodology provides a good but 
imperfect estimate of the average retirement incentives facing each age group in each country and time 
period. The focus on a single “early retirement route” leaves aside the participation effects of a number of 
other social transfer programmes that may actually be used as early retirement devices. Furthermore, the 
actual strictness of eligibility criteria for these programmes is imperfectly reflected in the calculations, as 
the latter assume – based on de jure policy settings as reflected in the law – that eligibility criteria are 
either fully strict or fully lax without allowing for intermediate degrees of stringency and enforcement. 
Implicit taxes rates on continued work across countries and time 
Looking at current policy settings, the dispersion of implicit tax rates in the “early retirement route” is 
very large across OECD countries (Figure 4).5
 
 Furthermore, implicit tax rates rose throughout most of the 
1970s and the 1980s, especially at age 55, as early retirement schemes were created and/or were becoming 
more generous. However, this expansion has come to a halt since the early 1990s, and has even been 
reversed in some countries (Figure 4). Implicit tax rates in old-age pension schemes only – i.e. ignoring 
early retirement schemes – show similar cross-country and time-series patterns, although they have 
typically been lower especially for workers in their late 50s. 
                                                     
5. These figures refer to the “steady state” of current pension systems. As a consequence, they incorporate all 
future effects of enacted reforms, some of which may not be fully felt before many years, as in particular in 
Italy where the so-called New Pension System is being gradually phased in and will not fully replace the 
existing one before the mid-2030s. In the empirical analysis, these “steady state” implicit taxes are not used 
and implicit tax rates facing the current generation of older workers are considered instead.  
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Figure 4. Average implicit tax rates on continued work for five more years  
in the “early retirement route” across countries and over time 
 
Source: OECD calculations. 
3.2. Empirical analysis of interactions between early retirement incentives and adverse shocks  
The issue of whether implicit taxes on continued work significantly affect the response of labour force 
participation to downturns can now be analysed. For this purpose the following regressions are estimated: 
 (3) 
where y indicates the (log) of real GDP and P is the level of the implicit tax on continued work (  being its 
average across all countries and time periods).  is now the difference between the labour force 
participation rates of the 60-64 and 25-54 age groups. This specification implies that 25-54 years-old are 
used as a control group, which allows controlling for all common factors that affect the labour force 
participation among all age groups and drastically limits the risk of reverse causality between the 
dependent variable and output growth. The risk of reverse causality between the dependent variable and 
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the implicit tax is also quite small: implicit taxes vary little over time but a lot across countries, and it is 
their level at time t that enters the specifications while changes in labor force participation are estimated for 
subsequent periods (t+1 to t+5). 
The coefficient  measures the effect of implicit taxes on continued work in shaping the response of 
labour force participation of older workers to economic conditions. The rationale for using the growth rate 
of GDP instead of the downturn dummies constructed above is that a specification with the latter would 
produce multicollinearity between the downturn dummies and the interaction term, given the low 
variability over time of implicit taxes on continued work. In contrast, Equation 3 does not suffer from this 
problem.6
Table 4 reports various estimates of the interaction coefficient 
 
 up to 5 years ahead. The main 
finding is that implicit taxes on continued work affect significantly the responsiveness of labour force to 
economic conditions up to 4 years ahead. In particular, a given negative GDP shock leads to a larger drop 
in labour force participation where early retirement incentives are high. The estimates of  and , not 
reported here to keep Table 4 simple, indicate that changes in labour force over time respond positively 
and significantly to (lagged) changes in output, and to a lesser extent to the level of implicit taxes. The 
results are robust to the inclusion of time trends, which are statically significant (second column of 
Table 4). 
Table 4. The effect of implicit tax in shaping the response of labour force participation  
to growth-linear interaction 
 
Baseline 
Baseline 
with time 
trend 
GAP<0 GAP>0 GAP<-2 GAP>-2 Average implicit tax 
T+1 
0.058 
(2.90)*** 
0.055 
(2.78)*** 
0.052 
(2.73)*** 
0.065 
(1.07) 
0.059 
(2.22)** 
0.050 
(1.33) 
0.069 
(2.89)*** 
T+2 
0.079 
(2.83)*** 
0.073 
(2.73)*** 
0.081 
(3.04)*** 
0.073 
(1.11) 
0.071 
(2.18)** 
0.075 
(1.75)* 
0.088 
(2.91)*** 
T+3 
0.098 
(2.71)*** 
0.088 
(2.93)*** 
0.092 
(2.79)*** 
0.124 
(1.75)* 
0.047 
(0.89) 
0.093 
(1.90)* 
0.094 
(2.63)*** 
T+4 
0.093 
(2.21)** 
0.081 
(2.48)** 
0.095 
(2.67)*** 
0.126 
(1.82)* 
0.061 
(1.19) 
0.086 
(1.67)* 
0.089 
(1.99)** 
T+5 0.050 (0.99) 
0.034 
(0.83) 
0.067 
(1.52) 
0.033 
(0.39) 
0.094 
(2.12)** 
0.021 
(0.36) 
0.044 
(0.83) 
Note: T-statistics based on robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
Source: OECD calculations. 
Further analysis is performed to check whether the responsiveness of changes in labor force 
participation differs between downturns and upturns, as should be the case given the asymmetric expected 
impact of retirement incentives mentioned above (third to sixth columns of Table 4). The results indeed 
suggest that the effect of implicit taxes is mostly significant in periods where output is below potential 
(negative output gap) or during downturns (output gap lower than -2 %).7
                                                     
6. Re-estimating the baseline equation (2) using the growth rate of GDP instead of downturn dummies on the 
right-hand side yields results that are qualitatively similar to those in Table 2, with a statistically significant 
impact of shifts in GDP growth up to six years after their occurrence.  
  
7. The results are qualitatively robust to different thresholds of negative gaps. 
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As an additional robustness check, the analysis is repeated averaging implicit taxes over time for each 
country. This further reduces any possible risks of reverse causality between changes in labour force 
participation and implicit taxes. The results in the last column of Table 4 remain very close to those 
obtained with time-varying implicit taxes in the baseline regression, consistent with the fact that implicit 
taxes are highly persistent over time, and that most of the variability is between countries. An alternative 
way of testing for the greater responsiveness of participation to economic conditions under stronger 
retirement incentives is to turn the implicit tax into a dummy variable based on a high-low cut-off:  
 (4) 
where  is an indicator that takes the value of 1 if the implicit tax exceeds a certain threshold 
and zero otherwise. The results obtained by estimating Equation 4 with a sample mean cut-off for the 
implicit tax still confirm the significant effect of the interaction term up to 4 years ahead (Table 5). These 
results are robust to the use of the median as cut-off. 
 
Table 5. The effect of implicit tax in shaping the response of labour force participation  
to growth-alternative interactions 
 Baseline with  time trend Average dummy Median dummy 
T+1 
0.055 
(2.78)*** 
0.123 
(2.15)** 
0.092 
(1.65)* 
T+2 
0.073 
(2.73)*** 
0.228 
(2.70)*** 
0.163 
(2.21)** 
T+3 
0.088 
(2.93)*** 
0.261 
(2.73)*** 
0.183 
(2.14)** 
T+4 
0.081 
(2.48)** 
0.228 
(2.04)** 
0.177 
(1.71)* 
T+5 
0.034 
(0.83) 
0.070 
(0.53) 
0.072 
(0.58) 
Note: T-statistics based on robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
Source: OECD calculations. 
 
 Finally, estimation of Equation 3 and 4 is repeated for men and women. The results reported in 
Table 6 and 7 suggest that while there is evidence of a significant effect of implicit taxes for both groups, 
the effects are significantly more robust for men than women. This could reflect a number of factors, 
including the fact that as computed here, implicit tax rates apply more strictly to males than to females – 
who over the sample period had incomplete careers in many countries, did not always benefit from full 
individual pension rights due to ceilings and tapers for joint pensions...etc. For men, the interaction effect 
is robust to the use of the median as cut-off. 
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Table 6. The effect of implicit taxes on continued work in shaping the response  
of labour force participation to growth – male vs. female 
 Men Women 
 
Baseline 
Baseline 
and time 
trend 
GAP<-2 GAP>-2 Baseline 
Baseline 
and time 
trend 
GAP<-2 GAP>-2 
T+1 0.064 
(2.12)*** 
0.059 
(2.09)*** 
0.082 
(2.26)*** 
0.043 
(0.80) 
0.051 
(2.28)** 
0.051 
(2.34)** 
0.068 
(1.99)** 
0.054 
(1.31) 
T+2 0.108 
(2.71)*** 
0.098 
(2.79)*** 
0.116 
(3.38)*** 
0.089 
(1.20) 
0.073 
(2.29)** 
0.073 
(2.39)** 
0.098 
(2.22)** 
0.085 
(1.68)* 
T+3 0.153 
(2.99)*** 
0.139 
(3.41)*** 
0.143 
(2.64)*** 
0.130 
(1.50) 
0.072 
(1.73)* 
0.072 
(1.91)* 
0.041 
(0.55) 
0.105 
(1.58) 
T+4 0.149 
(2.60)*** 
0.130 
(2.97)** 
0.244 
(3.73)*** 
0.113 
(1.25)* 
0.043 
(0.91) 
0.043 
(1.11) 
0.012 
(0.16) 
0.065 
(0.82) 
T+5 0.083 
(1.29) 
0.059 
(1.15) 
0.207 
(2.53)** 
0.031 
(0.029) 
0.017 
(0.28) 
0.017 
(0.34) 
0.100 
(1.48) 
0.002 
(0.02) 
Note: T-statistics based on robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively.  
Source: OECD calculations. 
Table 7. The effect of implicit taxes on continued work – male vs. female-alternative interactions 
 Men Women 
 Time trend Average dummy 
Median 
dummy Time trend 
Average 
dummy 
Median 
dummy 
T+1 
0.059 
(2.09)*** 
0.166 
(2.26)** 
0.140 
(2.02)** 
0.051 
(2.34)** 
0.067 
(1.05) 
0.036 
(0.57) 
T+2 
0.098 
(2.79)*** 
0.355 
(3.61)*** 
0.286 
(3.20)*** 
0.073 
(2.39)** 
0.138 
(1.41) 
0.070 
(0.79) 
T+3 
0.139 
(3.41)*** 
0.462 
(3.97)*** 
0.363 
(3.38)*** 
0.072 
(1.91)* 
0.143 
(1.31) 
0.034 
(0.33) 
T+4 
0.130 
(2.97)** 
0.433 
(3.04)*** 
0.302 
(2.34)*** 
0.043 
(1.11) 
0.063 
(0.53) 
-0.039 
(-0.35) 
T+5 0.059 (1.15) 
0.215 
(1.36) 
0.106 
(0.74) 
0.017 
(0.34) 
-0.013 
(-0.09) 
-0.089 
(-0.64) 
Note: T-statistics based on robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
Source: OECD calculations. 
One potential limitation of the empirical analysis is that the measure of retirement incentives covers 
only public and mandatory private pension systems but not voluntary private pension schemes. Since the 
latter are usually designed to be actuarially neutral, omitting them is unlikely to bias much the computation 
of implicit tax rates and therefore the results. However, it may still be the case that if downturns result in 
large and persistent falls in pension wealth, there may be an important income effect increasing the 
participation of older workers. Such participation-increasing effects would be expected to be larger in 
countries where private defined-contribution pension schemes play a prominent role in retirement 
provision, as is the case in particular in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, 
Denmark, Ireland and New Zealand (see e.g. OECD, 2009). To test for this hypothesis, the analysis in 
Equation 3 is replicated replacing the implicit tax measures with a dummy (DP) that takes value 1 for 
countries where private-sector defined-contribution pension schemes play a prominent role in retirement 
provision: 
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 (5) 
Equation 5 is estimated using alternatively a common time trend across countries, a country-specific 
time trend and time fixed effects. Country fixed effects are omitted here because of their high collinearity 
with the private pension scheme dummy. The results reported in Table 8 for all specifications tentatively 
suggest that the response of labour force participation to cyclical conditions is lower in countries where 
private defined-contribution pension schemes play a prominent role in retirement provision, i.e. a given 
negative GDP shock leads to a smaller drop in participation. The coefficient associated with the interaction 
term is negative and statistically significant up to two to four years. This hints at some potential 
heterogeneity in the labour force participation impact of downturns across countries depending on the role 
played by private pension schemes in pension provision. Such heterogeneity might extend to related issues 
such as the design of private pension schemes – not least the distinction between defined-benefit and 
defined-contribution schemes – and the extent to which asset prices are affected by the shock. 
Table 8. The effect of private pension schemes in shaping the response of labour force participation to growth 
 Common time trend Country-specific  time trend Time fixed effects 
T+1 
-0.161 
(-2.27)** 
-0.149 
(-2.05)** 
-0.168 
(-2.24)** 
T+2 
-0.232 
(-2.95)*** 
-0.204 
(-2.36)** 
-0.277 
(-3.29)*** 
T+3 
-0.174 
(-1.63)* 
-0.116 
(-1.00) 
-0.234 
(-2.20)** 
T+4 
-0.165 
(-1.22) 
-0.070 
(-0.47) 
-0.228 
(-1.70)* 
T+5 
-0.095 
(-0.57) 
0.048 
(0.27) 
-0.169 
(-0.99) 
Note: T-statistics based on robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively.  
Source: OECD calculations. 
It should be noted that any average positive participation effect of pension wealth losses is already 
factored in the baseline estimates of the impact of downturns on older workers’ participation presented in 
Section 2. Therefore these baseline estimates imply that any participation-increasing effects are typically 
more than offset on average by other participation-reducing factors. This is in line with recent micro-
econometric analysis for the United States which finds that incentives to delay the retirement decision 
stemming from the 2007-2008 asset price crash should be more than offset by the discouragement effects 
associated with depressed labour markets (Coile and Levine, 2009). 
4. Concluding remarks 
 This paper has presented new evidence for a panel of 30 OECD countries over 1960-2008 that 
past adverse economic shocks had persistent effects on aggregate labour force participation, mainly 
through their impact on the labour market attachment of young and older workers. For the latter, there 
appears to have been a significant and robust impact of early retirement incentives embedded in pension 
systems and other social transfer programmes in shaping the responsiveness of participation to economic 
conditions. The results also point to partial rather than full participation hysteresis, as would be expected if 
only because of cohort effects.  
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 One natural question this paper raises is whether the Great Recession of 2007-08 will lead to 
persistent declines in labour force participation, amplified in countries where early retirement incentives 
remain strong. This seems unlikely to be the case for three main reasons. First and foremost, participation 
declines are primarily triggered by the severe deterioration of the labour market situation that typically 
accompanies major downturns. However, the late-2000s recession was different in this regard, with a 
number of OECD labour markets showing surprising resilience to major declines in GDP levels – Germany 
being a striking example in this regard. Another reason why this time may be different is that many 
continental European countries have reduced retirement incentives over the past decade, as a result of 
pension reforms and some tightening of eligibility criteria to – or outright phasing-out of – other social 
transfer programmes that had been used as labour market exit pathways in the past. Finally, the recent 
global crisis has been associated with unusually large losses in pension and housing wealth, and these may 
induce older workers to stay longer in the labour force.  
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